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This paper shows that imperfections in the credit market and insecurity of property rights affect non-
uniformly the investment of younger and established microenterprises in Russia. The empirical analysis of 
investment is based on the liquidity constraint model but also accounts for the added challenged that the weak 
institutional structure and the small size of the enterprises pose. Investment in younger firms is most constrained by 
the availability of funds, while investment in more established microenterprises is affected by the ability of the 
entrepreneurs to “secure” their property rights by paying bribes. Financial institutions are unable to distinguish good 
from bad borrowers but lend to firms that have transparent transactions.     
 
1. Introduction 
Worldwide and particularly in transition economies, the entrepreneurial firm is perceived as an 
engine of economic growth. Across countries, entrepreneurs face various constraints and must 
overcome diverse challenges in order to sustain and expand their operations. This paper presents 
evidence that imperfections in the credit market and insecurity of property rights restrict small 
firms’ investment and growth in Russia. 
The ability of entrepreneurs to fund new projects is essential for business expansion. 
Small firms often face financing constraints because their internal funds are limited, and since 
small firms find it difficult to signal their quality to investors, external funds are not always 
available. In Russia, additional restrictions come from the weak institutional framework and 
numerous legal and regulatory constraints. Moreover, the supply of external finance is limited, 
due to the lack of skilled bankers and appropriate lending technologies. Under these 
circumstances, small firms’ investment is often limited to the amount of available internal funds.  
Recent studies have explored the degree to which firm size and financial leverage 
influence the sensitivity of investment to the availability of internal funds in small and medium-
sized enterprises (SME) in transition countries. The small firms’ financial needs, however, are 
related to the age of the firm (the financial growth cycle), but this relationship has been largely 
unexplored. Moreover, the supply of credit is determined by existing lending technologies, and 
standard banking technology is not friendly to younger firms. This paper investigates to what 
degree the investment of small firms of different ages is sensitive to the availability of internal 
funds, and how does the security of property rights influence this relationship. The analysis 
concludes with estimation of a credit supply equation, in order to determine whether providers of 
formal finance are able to resolve problems of asymmetric information and offer sufficient funds 
to meet the small firms’ demands.  
This paper is organized as follows. Part Two discusses the methodology and summarizes 
previous research on liquidity constraints in transition economies. Part Tree describes the Russian 
financial system for the period of the study. The data and the empirical specifications are 
presented in Parts Four and Five. Part Six summarizes the results. Conclusions are offered in Part 
Seven.  
2. Methodology and Previous Studies 
In a perfect capital market, the investment decision of the firm is independent of the source of 
finance (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). However, in the presence of transaction costs and   2
asymmetric information, external finance is either rationed or is available at a premium (Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981; Myers and Majluf, 1984). In such circumstances, external and internal finance 
are no longer perfect substitutes, and for firms facing high information costs, investment will be 
limited by the available internal funds (Fazzari et al., 1988). The financing constraint does not 
affect all firms uniformly, however, and the degree of effective constraint that various firms face 
provides information on the capacity of the financial system to fund the growth of firms. 
Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988) develop an empirical test to distinguish constrained 
from relatively less constrained firms. The methodology involves splitting the sample into sub-
samples, based on theoretical priors (size, age, financial leverage, and the like), and estimating 
reduced-form investment equations. Within each sub-sample (fixed) investment is regressed on 
two groups of variables – investment opportunities and cash flow. A test is then performed to 
check whether the difference between the estimated cash flow coefficients in the sub-samples is 
statistically significant. Statistically significant difference is evidence that firms with higher 
dependence on cash flow for investment face higher information costs and are most likely to be 
unable to obtain external funds. 
Studies have shown that the liquidity constraints that small and medium-size enterprises 
face in transition countries often differ from those observed in developed economies. In 
developed countries, the investment of the most informationally opaque firms (smaller, younger) 
is most sensitive to liquidity constraints (Fazarri et al., 1988). Budina et al. (1999) argue that, in 
Bulgaria, smaller firms are more liquidity constrained but for reasons different from those 
suggested by theory. These authors show that, due to the prevailing soft budget constraints that 
characterized bank lending, the investment of firms with a significant level of long-term debt 
(bigger, mainly state-owned firms) was not liquidity constrained, while the investment of firms 
without debt, as were most of the smaller private firms, showed higher sensitivity to liquidity. 
Chow et al. (2000) show that smaller firms in China are less liquidity constrained than bigger 
firms. The authors attribute this to the greater efficiency of smaller firms. Perotti and Gelfer 
(2000) find evidence that Russian firms with closer ties to industrial-financial groups face lower 
liquidity constraints than those who do not have ties to the banks.  
The institutional structure of the transition process also affects the behavior of small 
firms. In a weak institutional environment, corrupt government officials and  
(semi-) criminal organizations influence the security of property rights and thus firms’ investment 
and growth. Johnson et al. (1999) argue that firms will undertake projects with positive net 
present value only if convinced that they can use the fruits of the investment. If firms’ property 
rights are badly defined and poorly enforced, firms will be less willing to expand and will invest 
less. These authors develop a pecking order model of investment, and incorporate the specific 
transition circumstances through an index that reflects the security of property rights. They show 
that, prior to 1997, the investment of small firms in Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, and 
Russia was determined primarily by the security of property rights, while availability of internal 
and access to external funds were less important. Johnson et al. (1999) admit, however, that 
access to external finance will become important as profit margins decline.  
Using 1997 survey data from de novo firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, 
Bratkowski et al. (2000) also find that investment needs are met by the existing financial system. 
In their study, firms that did not apply for credit were less constrained by the availability of 
internal funds than was investment in firms that received credit. The authors also study what 
determines the supply of credit and find evidence that banks play an adequate role in financing 
small firms’ growth, successfully mitigating problems of asymmetric information. Pissarides et 
al. (2000) and Lizal and Svejnar (2000), however, provide evidence that the lack of adequate   3
access to external funds has significantly constrained investment in SMEs in Bulgaria and Russia, 
and the Czech Republic.  
Studies of liquidity constraints of firms in transition countries and in Russia have not 
accounted for the influence of the firm’s financial growth cycle.
1 The financial needs of newly 
created small firms may differ from those of older firms; younger firms may find it more difficult 
to signal their quality to lenders and thus obtain external finance. Moreover, most of the research 
has been undertaken for SMEs, where small firms hire up to 100 employees and medium firms 
hire up to 500 employees. Research on very small firms is limited because it is difficult to 
observe and measure their transactions. This paper adapts the liquidity constraints approach to 
study the financing constraints of very small firms, with up to 25 employees. 
 
3. Overview of the Russian Financial Sector  
Banking and banks in Russia have a very short history. The Soviet banking sector consisted of a 
mono-bank system, with a re-distributive function – supplying the planned funds from the public 
and the Government to enterprises and people. The banking reform of 1992 split up the main 
sectoral banks (the savings Sberbank, Vnesheconombank, and Agroprombank) into smaller 
banks. Unlike most transition countries, in Russia a very large number of new, private banks 
emerged shortly after the start of reform. While, up to 1995, the economy declined by 32 percent, 
the banking sector grew by 43 percent, and the number of new banks picked at 2,500 in 1995 
(Warner, 1997). Evidently, it was profitable to engage in banking activities but lending was not 
the activity that banks pursued.   
Post-soviet banking is characterized by three distinctive periods – from 1992 to 1995, 
from 1995 to the summer of 1998, and post 1998. During the first period, banks were primarily 
engaged in channeling the direct lending of the Government to state-owned enterprises and made 
their profits by paying only a 10 percent annual interest rate for funds, at a time when inflation 
reached 800 percent. Moreover, banks held more than 70 percent of their assets in non-interest 
bearing deposits. Cheap credit, however, did not flow to entrepreneurs. Banks rarely engaged in 
lending and kept the spread between lending and deposit interest rates broad, because the 
economic realities provided stronger incentives for other financial activities. For example, banks 
were allowed to hold foreign assets and profited from direct inflationary rents of servicing 
foreign transactions as well as from the fees collected as a result of the high demand for foreign 
currency (Warner, 1997).  
The banking reform of 1995 eliminated these sources of profits. Banks, however, found it 
difficult to collect deposits in the post-hyper-inflationary environment and thus lacked resources 
to acquire risk evaluation expertise and to develop new lending technologies. Moreover, the 
proliferation of barter rendered traditional banking services less appealing. Banks earned income 
by non-lending activities such as trading GKOs (a type of T-bills) and by organizing payment on 
veksels – financial instruments that enterprises used to extend credit to each other (Commander 
and Mumssen, 1998).  
Poorly designed and badly enforced regulations also impeded the ability of banks to lend. 
Banks were required to block the clients’ accounts if any default on tax payments occurred 
(Hendley et al., 1998). To reduce both the visibility of their transactions and the banks’ access to 
their accounts, enterprises avoided payments through the banking system. The restrictions on the 
free transfer of enterprises’ funds from non-cash into cash additionally prevented firms from 
                                                           
1 Financial growth cycle refers to the varying financial needs since time of creation through maturity. The approach 
has been criticized because it assumes that all firms have an equal desire to grow (life cycle trap).   4
opening and using bank accounts. These regulations made intermediation almost impossible, 
because banks could not collect information on their clients’ transactions and could not use such 
information when deciding to whom to lend. At the same time, the central bank failed to curb 
activities that indeed jeopardized the safety of the banking system. Prudent lending requires that 
banks develop and use financial products that match their information processing capabilities, so 
that the credit risk can be properly handled. Regulators failed to prevent the development of too 
sophisticated products, such as the infamous forward contracts for foreign currency, for which 
banks did not have the information processing capability (Roe et al., 1998).  
When the government defaulted on its GKOs in the summer of 1998, and the currency 
was devalued, many banks went bankrupt. The irony of the Russian crisis is that mainly smaller 
banks, engaged in prudent lending to small and medium-sized enterprises, were able to survive 
the 1998 financial crisis. Within a year following the August financial crisis, lending was 
stagnant.  
In an environment of low-level of intermediation, lending to smaller enterprises was even 
less appealing. Many, especially the big banks, found it unprofitable to lend to small and newly 
established firms. Traditional bank technology requires that a potential borrower presents audited 
financial statements for the previous three years. Such lending technology is inefficient, because 
banks do not trust financial statements in Russia. Moreover, younger firms (as were the majority 
of small firms) cannot satisfy the requirement of three years of financial statements. In developed 
countries, the credit history of the owner is widely used as an indicator for borrower credibility 
and managerial skills (Berger and Udell, 1998). Russian bankers, however, find it difficult to 
evaluate the managerial ability of an entrepreneur. For example, if a firm uses the informal 
sector’s help to enforce its contracts with business partners, banks have no means to evaluate and 
monitor such “business contracts”. At the same time, anecdotal evidence suggests that both banks 
and small entrepreneurs used private protection because they did not believe that the formal legal 
system could enforce their contracts. The higher cost of servicing smaller firms and the absence 
of a technology to deal with the specific risk kept the price of bank credit in Russia high (Roe et 
al., 1998). 
There are not many alternative sources of formal loans for micro and small businesses in 
Russia. Government programs to support small businesses are few, and they often primarily 
provide non-financial services. For example, the Federal Fund for Small Business Support 
provides mainly technical assistance, as its employees have limited experience with credit 
evaluation. The Regional Enterprise Support Funds, including the one operating in Samara, 
provide funding for small entrepreneurs but mainly to entrepreneurs who can invest a significant 
amount of their own capital. These government programs are capital constrained, tend to fund 
“priority sectors/activities,” and often misallocate resources, as government officials grant credits 
to friends and relatives.   
In the more rural areas, mutual credit associations and consumer cooperatives also 
provide some funds to their members. 
2 Innovative microfinance organizations (MFOs) that lend 
exclusively to micro and small businesses (Opportunity International, FINCA, the EBRD Small 
Business Fund) emerged in the mid-nineties but their influence is limited. MFO arrival is 
somewhat late because only recently have regulations changed to allow their operations.  
Overall, the high information costs that entrepreneurs face worldwide is accentuated in 
Russia by the lack of banking tradition and managerial skills, and by the limited information 
                                                           
2 There are no credit unions in Russia. 
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processing capability of the system. Moreover, banks operated in a restrictive legal environment, 
which discourages transparency of entrepreneurial activity and makes credit risk evaluation even 
more difficult. Alternative formal loans have limited capacity to fund small firms’ investment. As 
a consequence, Russian small businesses have been forced to rely even more on their internal 
funds for investment. 
 
4. The Data 
The data come from a survey of 203 very small enterprises (up to 20 empoyees) in Samara, 
Russia. The survey was implemented in August 1999, using a sample obtained from the 
Statistical Department of Samara Oblast.
 The database of the Statistical Department is 
comprehensive, because all entrepreneurs are required by law to register in order to start 
operations. The survey covered both individual private entrepreneurs and private companies. The 
sampling is subject to the usual bias that only surviving firms were surveyed.  
The firms in the sample are very small with average number of employees is 7.8 
(including the owner). Most of the firms are retail businesses, approximately a quarter operate in 
production and a quarter are in services (Table 1). Two thirds of the owners hold university 
degrees, but the share of the younger firms’ owners with a university degree is smaller than for 
the more mature firms. A third of the entrepreneurs indicated that they had specific plans to 
invest in physical capital in the forthcoming year and approximately a third reported that they 
faced limited opportunities and would have returned to their previous employment if that were 
possible.  
Russian entrepreneurs identified lack of funds as the main constraint to growth – 46 
percent reported financing as their most serious obstacle. Markets are the main constraint to grow 
for 43 percent of the entrepreneurs and direct regulations rank third, with 9 percent of the cases. 
When asked to rank current problems on a scale of one to four (where 1= least problematic, 2= 
sustainable, 3=problematic and 4 =most problematic), entrepreneurs ranked only taxes higher 
than financing. Corruption and private protection were ranked as least problematic (index of 2 
and 1.3, respectively). It seems that financing constraints dominate property rights issues, 
although this does not mean that businesses do not participate in extra-legal exchanges with 
government officials or private protection companies.  
We did not believe that we could obtain an honest answer if we asked the entrepreneurs 
directly about their transactions with government officials. To measure the influence of the 
security of property rights, we asked if the entrepreneurs thought that other businesses pay extra 
legally to government officials for various permits and for business protection. More than two 
thirds of the entrepreneurs reported that they believed that government officials are being paid 
extra-legally to issue permits and to protect the business. A third of the entrepreneurs also 
reported that they themselves pay people for protection (90 percent answered this question.). 
Moreover, about 40 percent believe that government officials can change and re-interpret rules 
concerning individual tax obligations.  
The combination of data on extra-legal payments and the ranking of constraints to growth 
seem to suggest that, after several years of changes, businesses have adapted to the environment 
and have colluded with government officials in establishing some basic security of property 
rights, which allow businesses to function. Bad laws serve a country best when badly enforced, 
because they allow the most efficient small firms to pay the fee and do their business, as 
suggested by the theory of the second best applied to small firms in Russia. The evidence also 
shows that younger firms rely more on private protection, while older firms rely more on 
extralegal transactions with government officials.   6
 
5. Empirical Specifications  
The empirical model is constructed after Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988). The sample is 
first split into two sub-samples – younger firms (age less or equal to 3 years) and older firms (age 
more than 3 years). We test whether the availability of internal funds influences the firms’ 
decision to invest in fixed capital. This specification captures the influence of the financial 
growth cycle, and is allows us to check whether the existing lending technology is biased against 
younger firms. In addition, the sample is split into micro (with less than 5 employees) and small 
firms (with 5 up to 35 employees) to study how size may influence investment sensitivity to cash 
flows.  
The biggest challenge in studying micro and small entrepreneurs’ investment is to 
distinguish between business and family assets. Any measure of the level of investment may be 
incorrect because it is not always possible to separate the physical capital that entrepreneurs use 
for private purposes from that used for business purposes. Furthermore, Russian entrepreneurs do 
not have any incentives to correctly represent their assets and the level of investment. On the 
contrary, pilot tests revealed that questions about the level of investment were systematically not 
answered. This problem is resolved here by the use a qualitative dependent variable (as in 
Johnson et al, 1999), which in a sense “endogenizes the scale”. Instead of a linear regression, we 
estimate a tobit model to establish whether a firms’ decision to invest in fixed assets can be 
explained by investment opportunity and availability of internal finance. The dependent variable 
takes the value of one if the firm has specific plans to invest in fixed capital in the following year, 
and zero otherwise.   
Employment growth is the variable used as a proxy for investment opportunities. An 
alternative is to use the change in sales as in many sales accelerator models. However, Anderson 
and Kegels (1997) and Grosfeld and Nivet (1997) have argued that in transition countries such 
backwards looking variables as sales are not an appropriate proxy for the expected profitability of 
investments. Bratkowski et al. (2000) have also maintained that sales growth is especially 
inappropriate for start-ups because those can have excellent investment prospects but their sales 
record would not be impressive. Bratkowski et al. (2000) and Johnson et al. (1999) use 
employment growth as a proxy for investment opportunities as in the present empirical 
specification. The variable that captures the cash flow influence is a dummy that takes the value 
of one if the entrepreneur indicated that he/she has positive cash flow.  
Estimation of probability that a firm will invest in fixed capital is augmented by 
variable(s) that represent the security of property rights. The index of property rights mirrors the 
index used by Johnson et al. (1999). It has a value of 0 if the entrepreneur has answered that he 
must pay extra legally for protection to informal groups, and to government officials for permits 
and business protection. The index has value of 3 if the entrepreneur does not pay for private 
protection, and believes that businesses do not pay extra legally to government officials for 
permits and businesses protection. In Johnson et al. (1999) value of zero stands for least secure 
property rights while value of three measures most secure property rights. Their index captures 
“security” of property rights when the legal system and institutions function normally and protect 
the property rights of businessmen. We argue, however, that in a weak institutional structure and 
property rights get “secured” through extralegal payments. A negative significant coefficient of 
the index of security of property tight, therefore, would be interpreted as evidence that bribes 
actually secure entrepreneurs property rights.   7
To control for the discretionary power of officials on taxes we use a dummy. It takes the 
value of one if the entrepreneur has indicated that he believes tax authority have discretionary 
power to change individual tax obligations and zero otherwise. 
To gain additional information on the possibility that in the formal credit market younger 
and smaller firms are more rationed we estimate a tobit model of credit supply, following 
Bratkowski et al. (2000). The dependent variable is one if the applicant received a formal loan 
and zero if the applicant was denied a formal loan. The sample consists of only those firms that 
have applied for formal credit so that identification is achieved. A self-selection bias may exist 
because entrepreneurs who believe they cannot obtain a formal loan have not applied.  
The explanatory variables in the credit supply equation must affect only credit supply but 
not investment in order to achieve proper identification of the effect of credit constraints on 
investment. Prudent lending requires that banks fund profitable projects and guard against 
unexpected events by requiring collateral. Employment growth is used as a proxy for profitability 
of the project. The data set does not contain information on the availability of collateral, but 
collateral can alleviate asymmetric information problems only if the lender can promptly 
repossess and resell the asset to recuperate the loss. In Russia, however, very few physical assets 
can serve as collateral. For example, only in specific circumstances can apartments serve as 
collateral (Nadolnyak and Hartarska, 1999). Furthermore, since it is expensive and time 
consuming to seize collateral, and since reselling the assets on underdeveloped secondary 
markets is not always possible, banks in Russia are forced to use other methods to guard against 
losses.  
Russian entrepreneurs often manipulate their financial statements therefore lending based 
on financial statements would not be prudent. However, Russian firms that use the banking 
system to pay suppliers and to receive payments from clients have established a record that banks 
can use to evaluate borrowers’ credibility. Moreover, by using the banking system firms signal 
that they are better quality clients because such firms risk having their assets frozen if they are 
unable to meet tax obligations. Finally, firms that actively use the banking system are de facto 
providing collateral, as the funds in their accounts will be seized in case of default. A dummy that 
takes the value of one if the borrower has actively used his bank account and zero otherwise is 
used to measure whether banks have used firms’ payment record to guard against default.  
In developing countries, banks often use the personal credit history of the owner of the 
business when deciding who gets credit (Berger and Udell, 1998). We use the entrepreneurs’ age 
and education level as a proxy for entrepreneurial abilities. 
 
6. The Results 
Both investment opportunities and cash flow have a positive and significant effect on the 
probability that a firm will invest in fixed assets when sub-sampling is done according to age. 
Significant Chi-squared confirms that the approach is appropriate. Models one and two (Table 2) 
show that younger firms with internal funds are 60 percent more likely to invest than are younger 
firms who do not have internal funds. Older firms with internal funds are 40 percent more likely 
to invest than are older firms without internal funds. Clearly, the investment decision is linked to 
internal capital and the information costs that younger firms face are higher than the information 
costs that older and more established firms face. Overall, investment in younger firms is 20 
percent more dependent on the availability of internal capital than is investment in older firms. 
The difference between the coefficients on the cash flow variable is statistically significant. 
The security of property rights has a non-uniform influence over the investment decision 
of small firms in Russia. Older firms’ decision to invest is affected by the security of property   8
rights but the index of security of property rights in insignificant in the investment equation for 
younger firms. These results are technically contrary to what Johnson et al. (1999) found. 
However, these authors use data from the earlier stages of the economic transition, when profit 
margins were high and there was a lack of information regarding the bribe practices of various 
government officials and private “protection firms”. The more people (“institutions”) 
entrepreneurs had to bribe, the more discouraged they became regarding the future of their 
business and invested less. This is well captured by the security of property rights index where 
more “secure” property rights means paying to a smaller number of officials. Unlike in 1996, in 
1999 Russian established businesses were well aware of the extra legal prices charged by various 
government officials and private protection people. Therefore, the more extralegal “relationships” 
older firms secured through extra legal payments, the more likely were they to invest and expand 
the business. In this sense, the results here confirm the suggestion of Johnson et al. (1999) that it 
is the insecurity regarding the incidence of extra legal payments, not the need to pay extra legally 
that affects firms’ investment decision. For younger firms, however, the need to grow may 
outweigh concerns of property rights security as shown by the insignificant coefficient on the 
index of security of property rights.  
Taxes rank highest within the group of current problems, and 40 percent of the 
entrepreneurs believe that tax authorities have the discretionary power to reinterpret individual 
tax obligations. Surprisingly, however, the dummy for discretionary power of government 
officials is insignificant in firms’ investment equations (Table 2, Model 2). This result only 
strengthens the conclusion that the necessity to bribe per se does not deter investment. Industry 
controls show that in both groups retail businesses do not plan to expand their activities, while 
younger firms operating in both retail and services have limited investment opportunities.  
The results from the credit supply equation suggest that lenders were not successful in 
identifying the best investment projects because profitability, at least as proxied by average 
employment growth, did not influence who did or did not receive credit (Table 3). Moreover, 
unlike lenders in developed countries who extensively use the main owners’ personal 
characteristics as a measure of borrower credibility, banks in Russia were unable to distinguish 
entrepreneur’s type, at least not if management abilities can be proxied by managers’ age and 
education. Banks, however, attempted to guard against default by lending to firms who actively 
used the banking system for their business transactions and who built a payment history. The 
upshot is that small businesses who did not want to have their activities transparent by using the 
official payment system had very limited access to formal loans and had to limit their investment 
to the amount of internal sources or informal loans.  
Age is not significant in the credit supply equation. Nevertheless, it may only appear that 
banks did not discriminate on the basis of age, because this result may be due to a self-selection 
bias – younger firms, aware that they can not get a formal loan did not even apply. Size played a 
role in the supply of credit but bigger firms had only a slight advantage. Finally, banks did not 
believe that the service industry offers good returns to investment, so projects in services were 
generally not funded.  
 
7. Conclusions 
Research on the financing constraints of very small firms is scarce because it is difficult to 
observe and measure very small firms’ transactions. This paper contributes to the literature by 
studying the relationship between firm age and liquidity constraints. The liquidity constraint 
model is adapted to the specific circumstances of small firms in Russia, and the process of 
economic transition is added through an index of security of property rights.    9
We find evidence that investment in small firms is strongly influenced by the availability 
of internal capital. Overall, younger firms’ investment is 20 percent more dependent on internal 
capital than is investment in older firms. The security of property rights influences investment 
only in more mature firms. The more extralegal relationships older firms had “secured” through 
extra legal payments, the more likely they were to invest and expand the business. The upshot is 
that insecurity regarding the incidence of extra legal payments, not the need to pay extra legally 
affects firms’ investment decisions. Results also show that for younger firms the need to grow the 
business outweighs property rights concerns. The formal financial sector did not channel funds to 
the most successful investment projects but there is evidence that loans were given to firms that 
had more transparent transactions.   10
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Attachment 




age is less 
than 3 years 
Enterprise age 
is more or 
equal to 3 years
Industry         
Production (%)  23.6  18  27 
Trade (%)  48.3  54  43 
Services (%)  28.1  27  29 
      
Average Number of Employees   7.8  6.8  10.5 
      
Average Employment Growth  
(Annual percentage change) 
35 54  17 
      
Plan to invest in physical capital   33  32  33 
    
Would like to return to previous employment  32  30  33 
      
Have positive cash flow    32  31 
      
Use bank account  58.0  58  34 
    
Constraints to growth       
Financing Constraints  46  47  46 
Regulation induced  9  14  8 
Markets 43  39  46 
      
Ranking of the current problem  
(1 least problematic, 4 most problematic) 
    
Financing   2.2  2.3  2.1 
Corruption 2.0  1.9  2.1 
Taxes 2.9  2.7  3.0 
Protection People  1.2  1.3  1.2 
      
% who believe that other businesses pay extra 
legally to government officials for permits 
68.9 67  71 
% who believe that other businesses pay 
extralegally to government officials for business 
protection 
71.8 69  76 
% who pay for protection  
(including racket) 
36.1 40  33 
% who believe that other businesses pay extra 
legally to government officials to facilitate tax 
payment 
46.6 46  48 
Source: OSU survey   13
Table 2. Probit Investment in Fixed Capital 
 Model  1 
 
Young            Older 
Model 2 
 





















Index of “security” of 





























Chi Squared  11  20  10.5  20 
P  p>0.04 p>0.001 p>0.05 p>0.001 
  Observations  93 110 93 110 
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Table 3. Credit Supply. Probit Received a Formal Loan  
(The sample includes only those who applied for a formal loan) 







Credit History  




























Chi Squared  20.1  21.7 
P 
 
p>0.001 p>0.001 
Observations 
 
92 92 
 